Introduction
It is commonly believed that individuals do not capture all of the benefits from their ownership of human capital. This belief is often cited to justify government subsidies to formal education. As Schultz (1988) states in his survey of the role of education in economic development, "education is widely viewed as a public good (with positive externalities), which increases the efficiency of economic and political institutions while hastening the pace of scientific advance". Recently human capital externalities have come to bear considerable explanatory weight in formal theoretical modelling. Lucas (1988) allows the average national level of human capital per worker to act as an externality that flicks-neutrally shifts the aggregate production function. Azariadis and Dra.zen (1990) follow Lucas in assuming that the average level of human capital is a "social input" to aggregate production in their model.
The microeconomic foundation of this external effect of human capital is the sharing of knowledge and skills between workers that occurs through both formal and informal interaction. The "diffusion and growth of knowledge" that takes place as a result of that interaction is modelled in a paper by Jovanovic and Rob (1989) . In their model individuals augment their knowledge through pairwise meetings at which they exchange ideas. In each time period each individual seeking to augment his knowledge meets an agent chosen randomly from a distribution of agents/ideas. Though a proof requires additional assumptions, intuitively it seems clear that the higher the average level of human capital (knowledge) of the agents, the more "luck" the agents will have with their meetings and the more rapid will be the diffusion and growth of knowledge. If this knowledge concerns technological improvements, we have a microeconomic foundation not only for external effects of human capital on total factor productivity, but also for making those external effects dependent on the average level of human capital.
Given the existence of human capital externalities, economically identical workers will tend to earn higher wages in human capital rich than in human capital poor countries.
This result is consistent with the large realized net migration from the latter to the former countries and unsatisfied demand for further immigration. The problem with inferring that human capital externalities cause these wage differentials is that a high average level of human capital is associated with a high level of economic development.1 A high level of economic development is in turn associated with other factors that tend to cause high wages such as a large and technologically current stock of physical capital per capita. For this reason it would obviously be very difficult to econometrically identify the effects of human capital externalities with any confidence using cross-country data, even if we were to overcome the problems of cross-country data comparability. By looking at different regions within one country, however, we can identify these effects, since if the country has a well-developed electronic communications system the cost of capital and the level of "disembodied" technological knowledge will presumably be the same within its borders.
Indeed, Lucas argues that metropolitan areas are the most appropriate units to examine when looking for the productivity-enhancing effects of human capital abundance. He cites the work of Jane Jacobs, The Economy of Cities (1969) , which provides numerous concrete examples of "creative" economic life in cities where external economies generated by interaction among educated and/or experienced individuals are important. It certainly seems reasonable to think that random meetings, as opposed to costly, prearranged ones, would take place within a limited spatial area rather than uniformly distributed over an entire country.2 ' Balassa (1979) computes a rank correlation coefficient of .754 between per capita GNP and the Harbison-Myers index of human resource development for 36 countries evenly divided between developed and less developed. 2One concrete example of how these externalities work was provided to me by a Silicon Valley engineer. He explained that firms locating in the San Jose metropolitan area were able to benefit from what he called "cross-pollenization of ideas" because of the constant movement of both engineers and lower-level technical workers between the firms located there. By dramatically reducing transportation costs, geographic concentration facilitates this movement, which is analogous to the random "meetings" modelled by Jovanovic and Rob.
By generating higher wages for a given set of individual characteristics, productivity benefits from geographic concentration of human capital set up strong pressures for migration. Since within a country people are free to migrate (there are usually no immigration or emigration barriers), why are wages not driven to equality for all economically identical agents? The answer given by the simple local public goods model below is that migration to high wage areas leads to higher residential and commercial rents there, which offset the higher wages and allow for a spatial equilibrium where utility levels and production costs are equalized across metropolitan areas. Cities with higher average levels of human capital should therefore have higher wages and higher land rents. After conditioning on the characteristics of individual workers and dwellings, I will test this prediction below using data for Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) in the United States, where the SMSA average levels of formal education and work experience are used as proxies for the average level of human capital. If the data support this prediction, my model will also allow me to estimate the magnitude of the productivity benefits realized from geographic concentration of human capital.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. A formal model that treats the average level of human capital as a local public good is presented in section 2. In section 3 I estimate the model of section 2 in reduced form. Section 4 deals with the possibility of omitted variable bias in the results of section 3 by controlling for additional SMSA local public goods likely to be correlated with the SMSA average level of human capital, and also evaluates the argument that the results of section 3 are due to selection bias. In the concluding section I compute an estimate of the effect of an additional year of average education on total factor productivity and compare my estimate to one that can be obtained from the growth model calibration exercise of Lucas (1988) .
The formal model
The model of this section is a straightforward adaptation of the local public goods model of Roback (1982) . To minimize repetition I will therefore be very brief in my description.
Assume that households and firms are freely mobile between a fixed number of SMSAs in the sense that their cost of changing locations is zero, though once they choose to locate in a particular SMSA they cannot work (employ workers) in another SMSA. For simplicity intracity commuting is not considered. Each SMSA offers a fixed amount of land and a given bundle of site characteristics 8, where the subscript j indexes the SMSAs. Households gain utility through use of a composite commodity, local residential land, and local site characteristics. Site characteristics are local public goods (climate is a good example), while use of the composite commodity and land are purchased out of labor earnings, which comprise all of income. (Here I have adopted the assumption of Henderson 
where V is the indirect utility enjoyed by the owner of one efficiency unit of labor, r is the rent on one unit of land, and u0 is the common nationwide utility level for owners of one efficiency unit. Firms combine capital, local labor and local land to produce the composite commodity. The return to capital is fixed by an international capital market. Prices, wages, and rents are normalized on the price of the composite good, so that the price of the 3This is the Lucas (1988) 
where c is the unit cost function. The cost of capital has been suppressed since it is equal across all SMSAs.
Combining the conditions for spatial equilibrium among consumers and firms leads to It is important to note that, because there is no spatial sorting of consumers by efficiency unit endowment, itself is left undetermined by my model. In particular, it is not inlluenced by w or r. In the empirical work of sections 3 and 4 below it is simplest to think of h as historically predetermined.
Consider a site characteristic that increases productivity but has no amenity value.
A higher value of that characteristic will shift out the firm equilibrium curve uniformly while leaving the consumer equilibrium curve in place. According to the discussion in the introduction,4 the local average level of human capital can be thought of as just such a site characteristic.5 As can be seen using Figure 1 , the result is that an SMSA with a higher h will have a higher wage per efficiency unit of labor and a higher rent per unit of land, holding other site characteristics constant. This result is robust to a common generalization of the model given by equations (1) and (2) (see, for example, Roback (1982) and Beeson and Eberts (1989) ), which is to allow for local production of housing services that households consume rather than consuming land services directly. Insofar as a higher h tends to enhance the productivity of housing service production, the effect of a higher on the wage rate is dampened because the impact on households of the higher rent on land is dampened, causing them to require a smaller wage differential to be compensated for the higher land rental. It can be shown that even if the effect of on housing service productivity is as great (as measured by the absolute value of the cost function elasticity)
A constant productivity differential due to differences in h is the result generated by models such as those of Lucas (1988) and Azariadis and Drazen (1990) . However, the microfoundations of these models suggest that a higher hleads to more rapid diffusion and growth of knowledge, implying an increasing productivity differential. One could reconcile the two specifications by supposing that after a certain fixed interval of time knowledge created within an SMSA becomes disembodied (reproduced on blueprints or taught in business schools) and thus available to the nation (or world) at large. In this case overall productivity will increase at the same rate across all SMSAs but a fixed productivity differential will exist between SMSAs with different average levels of human capital.
The possibility that some amenity value may be associated with will be considered in the empirical discussion of section 4.1.
as its effect on composite commodity productivity, the wage differential will still be positive provided that the share of rent in the cost of housing services is greater than in the cost of composite commodity production.
Evidence
The system consisting of equations (1) and (2) that is depicted in Figure 1 decision. Since iij is not influenced by w or rj I treat it in the same way that exogenous variables like climate are treated in the empirical local public goods literature (see Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn (1988) for a recent example) and enter it directly into the reduced form regressions. On the basis of the discussion in section 2 we expect this variable to have a positive coefficient in both the wage and the rent equations. If these coefficients are significant their size will allow me to determine the importance of the productivity benefits realized from geographic concentration of human capital in a manner
to be made precise below.
I need an empirical translation of the theoretical concept of homogeneous human capital. In the empirical labor economics literature, the human capital that an individual accumulates over her lifetime is typically decomposed into two measurable components:
education and experience, measured by years of schooling completed and age minus years of owners, reported house value is converted to monthly imputed rent using a 7.85 percent discount rate taken from a user cost study by Peiser and Smith (1985) . Monthly expenditures for utilities are added to obtain gross imputed rent for owners. The dependent variable in the wage equation is the logarithm of average hourly earnings.
Average hourly earnings are obtained by dividing annual earnings by the product of weeks 61n order to insure more accurate reporting of home values, Beeson and Eberts (1989) limit their sample to individuals who changed addresses between 1975 and 1980. However, for most individuals their largest asset is their home (Pearl and Frankel, 1984) , so we might expect home owners to be fairly accurate when asked to estimate the value of their units.
Cross-sectional studies have in fact found this to be true on average (Kain and Quigley, 1972; Robins and West, 1977) .
worked during the year and usual hours worked per week.'
The wage and rent hedonic equations were estimated using observations on 69,910 individuals and 44,758 households, respectively, residing in 237 SMSAs. I use the same set of variables used by Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn (1988) to control for the characteristics of individual workers and dwellings. The Census control variables listed in Tables 1 and 2 are self-explanatory. The omitted broad occupational category in the wage equation is service. The only non-Census control variable is the percent of the individual's industry that is unionized, which is taken from a study by Kokkelenberg and Sockell (1985) .
The standard procedure in the empirical local public goods literature (see, e.g., the work of Roback (1982) and Blomqwst, Berger, and Hoehn (1988) cited above) is to estimate the wage and rent hedonic regressions using ordinary least squares (OLS). Their underlying statistical model is therefore Y1j=a+Xj/3+ZJlr+(jJ (5) where i indexes the individual workers or dwellings, jcontinues to index cities, y is the dependent variable (in our case either the log wage or the log rent), x is a vector of observed individual characteristics, z is a vector of observed city characteristics, and is an error term that captures the effects of unobserved individual characteristics and satisfies all the properties of the classical regression model. The OLS model implicitly assumes that all relevant city characteristics are observed. if, as seems reasonable to believe, this is not the case, then a more appropriate model is the random effects model = a + x8 + zçy + + ,
where p is an error term that captures the effects of unobserved city characteristics and also satisfies all the properties of the classical regression model. Equation (6) can be 7luclusion of nontraded services other than housing in the model of section 2 might suggest adjusting wages for differences across SMSAs in non-housing cost of living. However, separate cost of living indices are reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for only 28 metropolitan areas covering 33 SMSAs. Beeson and Eberts (1989, p. 451) report that these non-housing cost of living indices vary by only plus or minus four percent of the national average.
viewed as the outcome of a model where city effects on wages and rents are explained by observed and unobserved city characteristics:
= xfl + + (7) where 5 is the city effect on log wages (log rents).
Since the error term = + in equation (6) 3. Use the estimates of and from steps 1 and 2 to compute a consistent estimate of 8Speciflcally, the variance-covariance matrix for observations within any city j generated by the error term has off-diagonal terms equal to the variance of p, rather than zero.
9My experience with OLS estimates of this model is in accord with the findings of Moulton (1986) , who reviewed several studies where equations were estimated using both individual and group level data: the null hypothesis of spherical errors is rejected and the OLS standard errors on the coefficients for the group level variables tend to be much smaller than those estimated using the random effects model, leading to much higher t ratios for these coefficients in the OLS case.
and make the appropriate GLS transformation of the data (see, e.g., Greene (1990, p. 487) ).
In column (1) of Tables 1 and 2 , respectively, I report the least squares dummy variable estimates of the hedonic wage and rent equations from step 1. Except for anomalous negative coefficients giving the effects of condominium status and city sewer connection on log rents, the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients on the characteristics of individual workers and dweilings are as expected and are in line with those obtained by other studies. Column (2) gives the GLS estimates of these equations including the SMSA average levels of education and experience. The coefficients on the individual variables remain virtually unchanged from column (1), and the coefficients on the SMSA variables have the positive signs predicted by the theory of section 2. All of the latter coefficients are significant at the one percent level except for the coefficient on the SMSA average level of experience in the wage equation, which is insignificant. It appears that the average level of human capital is a productive local public good as described in section 2. It is also important to note that the average level of education has a much greater productive external effect than the average level of experience. While at this level of empirical analysis I cannot investigate directly the cause of this difference, it appears to be consistent with the inicroeconomic foundation for external effects of human capital described in the introduction to this paper. There it was argued that the average level of human capital influences productivity indirectly through its effect on sharing of ideas for technological improvements. It stands to reason that the probability that a meeting between agents/ideas in an SMSA will be "productive" is increased more by a year of SMSA average education than by a year of SMSA average experience, since a major part of formal education is concerned with communication skills, i.e., reading, writing, and (to a lesser extent) oral presentation. without obtaining better result8.
It is widely believed that workers in the U. S. South tend to be less educated than workers elsewhere in the country. Indeed, in our wage sample the average level of education for the U. S. Census region South is 12.7 years of schooling, compared to 13.2, 12.8, and 12.9 years for the West, North Central, and Northeast regions, respectively. If there are historical or other reasons independent of average education levels that cause Southern productivity to be lower, failing to control for the region in which workers reside and homes are located could bias upwards the coefficient on SMSA average education in the wage and rent equations. As seen in column (3) of Tables 1 and 2 , inclusion of regional dummies does in fact reduce the estimated coefficient on average education substantially in both equations. As expected, residence outside the South has a positive effect on both wages and rents.
Average education may also be correlated with omitted variables that have amenity value. Since amenities shift down the consumer equilibrium curve in Figure 1 , lowering wages and raising rents, such a correlation would bias downwards (upwards) the estimated coefficient on average education in the wage (rent) equation. The obvious candidate for an SMSA-level amenity that is correlated with average education is cultural facilities. Places Rated Almanac (1981) has compiled a "culture per capita" index based on SMSA possessions of major universities, symphony orchestras, opera companies, dance companies, theaters, public television, fine arts radio, museums, and public libraries (see pp. 293-294
and 320 for exact definition). I have subtracted the major universities component since I argued above that this could have a productivity effect (though I found no evidence for it).
This corrected culture per capita index is then included as an explanatory variable in column (4) of Tables 1 and 2 . We see that in the wage equation the effects are as expected:
the coefficient on culture per capita is negative and significant at the five percent level, '4Since we saw in our discussion of regional effects above that average education is highest in the West and next to lowest in the North Central region, we might expect a positive correlation in our wage sample between SMSA climate rating and SMSA average education, and indeed the correlation coefficient is 0.27. On the other hand, the wage coefficients on both SMSA average level of human capital variables fall.
In the model of section 2, SMSA population NJ does not enter the list of relevant SMSA site characteristics s. I am thus able to solve the model sequentially by first using equations (1) and (2) to solve for r3 and w as functions of and next using equation (4) to substitute out for SMSA output X in equation (3), which then determines N as a function of s and SMSA land L. However, much empirical research in urban economics starts from the premise that city population could be a consumption disamemty (e.g., Roback (1982)) or that it could increase productivity (e.g., Henderson (1986) and the references cited therein). In this case w, and NJ are simultaneously determined. Fortunately, equation (3) immediately suggests using SMSA land area as an instrument for SMSA population. 15
Total land area, as opposed to the quality of a given plot of land, can reasonably be supposed to have neither productivity value nor amenity value, and can therefore be excluded from equations (1) and (2). It follows that in this case the wage and rent reduced form equations are just identified, and we can estimate them by applying the method of instrumental variables to the data after it has been subjected to the GLS transformation Tables 1 and 2 plus land area. In this regression population is expressed in thousands and land area in sample correlation coefficient between coastal location and average education is only 0.02. If entered separately, the climate and coast variables both reduce the coefficient on average education in the wage equation to 0.035. lZThe model implicitly assumes that land area is given exogenously by arbitrary political boundaries. To the extent that outlying political jurisdictions are added to an SMSA on the basis of population, land area may to some extent be endogenous for the same reasons as population. l6This is the "IV-GLS analog" estimation recommended by Bowden and Turkington (1984, Chapter 3 The partial correlation coefficient between SMSA population and land area implied by the t-ratio for the latter is 0.34. We can conclude that land area is a useful but far from perfect instrument for population.
With this information in hand, we look at the estimates reported in column (6) of Tables 1 and 2 . We see that the coefficients on population in both the wage and rent equations are insignificant, although the signs of the coefficients support the view that population is a consumption disamenity. In view of the quality of the instrument we have for population one should hesitate to draw the conclusion that population is not a relevant site characteristic. The coefficients on the SMSA-level variables that were positively associated with population in the cross-SMSA regression all fall slightly in the wage equation and rise slightly in the rent equation. The standard errors for the coefficients on the variables for which that association was significant rise noticeably in both equations.
The only important result of these changes is that the coefficient on SMSA average education in the wage equation is now only significant at the ten percent level. However,
given that the results in column (6) indicate that we have added an irrelevant variable to both the wage and rent equations, we must conclude that the preferred model remains that in column (5).
Sell-Selection
It is possible that the positive effects of SMSA average education in the wage equations of Table 1 reflect its association with higher unobserved ability of workers rather than higher productivity of a given worker. This could happen because higher average education in an SMSA is positively correlated with the return to unobserved ability or skill, causing higher quality workers to migrate to SMSAs with higher average education levels. A formal model of this spatial selection or sorting process is set out by Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo in their paper, "Self-Selection and Internal Migration in the United
States" (1992). They apply the Roy (1951) model of occupational choice to selection between regions of residence. Their model can be expressed using the notation of equation (7) above if we impose more structure on the error term Specifically, it is supposed that the log wage of individual i in region (SMSA) j is given by (7') where indexes an individual's unobserved ability or skills and is a continuous random variable with mean zero and a range defined over the real number line. The parameter can then be interpreted as the "rate of return" to ability in SMSA j. Other things equal, it is clear that an individual with a high (low) realization of b will want to live and work in an SMSA with a high (low) i. In fact, Borjas et al. are able to show that E(bI choose j) > E(&Ichoose k) if and only if ,> ,.
We can complete the formalization of the selection argument by supposing that ,is positively correlated with the average level of formal schooling in an SMSA, in which case this average will have a positive coefficient in the log wage equation that reflects selection bias.
I will investigate the selection argument by examining both what it implies and
what is does not imply. Taking the second approach first, one can note a key difference between the model just outlined and the model of section 2: the latter is a general equilibrium model that determines SMSA rents as well as wages, while the former is a partial equilibrium model that determines SMSA wage levels only. More specifically, in the model of section 2 rents and wages adjust so as to make all individuals indifferent concerning in which SMSA they live and work. If the model of section 2 is correct that SMSA average education is a site characteristic that increases productivity but has no amenity value, then ceteris paribus an additional year of SMSA average education should raise rents so as to just offset the benefit to consumers from its positive effect on wages. In short, changes in SMSA average education should shift the firm equilibrium curve in Figure   1 along an unchanged consumer equilibrium curve. On the other hand, the Roy model of spatial selection makes no predictions concerning inter-SMSA rent differentials. Thus the apparent effect of SMSA average education on wages, which according to this model is due to selection bias, should have no particular relationship to any effect of SMSA average education on rents. A finding of the relationship predicted by the model of section 2 would therefore be a remarkable coincidence.
The consumer equilibrium curve is defined by equation (1) in section 2. By logarithmically differentiating this equation and using Roy's identity, we can show that movement along the consumer equilibrium curve implies
where is the share of consumers' (labor) income spent on rent. Note that (dr/dx)/r and (dw/dx)/w are given by the coefficients on independent variable x in the rent and wage equations, since log(r) and log(w) are the dependent variables. We should be able to accept the hypothesis that = 0 when we substitute into equation (8) One can also attempt to directly address the implication of the selection model that SMSA average education is positively correlated with the SMSA return to ability i.
Following Borjas et al., we note from (7') that is proportional to the extent of earnings inequality, so that one can use wage dispersion within each region to measure returns to ability.'1 They compute two measures of wage dispersion, whose construction I imitate exactly. The first is the standard deviation of the log hourly wage, which they call the "unstandardized" dispersion in wages. The alternative "standardized" measure of dispersion is the root mean square error from SMSA-speciflc log wage regressions. The 
Condusions
I began this paper by noting the widespread belief in the existence of positive 'If the spatial sorting generated by the model (7') is sufficiently strong, the differences between wage dispersions across regions cx ante will be greatly attenuated ex post. However, the descriptive statistics reported show substantial variation across SMSAs in the measures of wage dispersion that I use.
'8The model (7') suggests that the error term i.
might be groupwise heteroskedastic. No significant changes in the wage and rent equations reported in Tables 1 and 2 occur if we adjust the GLS transformation to allow for this. the existence of these externalities. I am now in the position to answer the question of how large is the effect of an additional year of average education on total factor productivity.
Using the coefficients on the average level of human capital variables reported in Tables 1 and 2, 1 can compute an estimate of the percentage cost reduction (total factor productivity increase) that would result from an additional year of average education, taking the conservative view that this implies an offsetting one year reduction in average experience. By logarithmically differentiating equation (2), we obtain:
Or(dI/dh)/r + 9(dw/dh)/w = -(ôc/)/c, (9) where and °w are the land and labor shares in the value of output, respectively. I follow Beeson and Eberts (1989, P. 448) , who use national accounts data to compute the figures 0.064 and 0.73 for and 0 Substituting into equation (9) My best estimate on the basis of the evidence presented in this paper is therefore that each additional year of SMSA average education can be expected to raise total factor productivity by 2.8 percent, with a standard error of estimate of 0.8 percent.
Is this estimate reasonable? The only other attempt to quantify the productivity effect of the average level of human capital of which I am aware is in Lucas (1988) . He builds a theoretical model of long-run growth where the "engine of growth" is accumulation of human capital, and the average level of human capital raised to a power enters the aggregate production function. Lucas "estimates" that exponent using U. S. data under the assumption that the United States was on the balanced growth path described by his model during the period 1909-1957. (He notes that one could fit this data equally well using a model in which there is no human capital externality.) The result is 0.417, which is basically driven by the difference between the rates of growth of physical and human capital per capita estimated by Denison (1961) . This exponent implies that an additional year of average education increases U. S. total factor productivity by 3.2 percent.19 My estimate of 2.8 percent therefore seems very reasonable in light of the only other comparable figure available. While one would obviously not want to make too much of the closeness of the two numbers, it is nevertheless encouraging to see this degree of agreement between cross-sectional and time series findings.
In section 3 I argued that the difference found between the effects of the SMSA average levels of education and experience supports the hypothesis that my results reflect productivity benefits from geographic concentration of human capital caused by sharing of
ideas. Yet I would hesitate to claim that this study has enabled us to "see" sharing of ideas at work: this may require empirical analysis at a still further disaggregated level than the city. Rather it is hoped that this study will serve both as a springboard for more detailed research and as a stimulus to attempts at replication, perhaps using data from countries other than the United States.
l9There is no experience component of human capital in Lucas's model or in the estimate of the rate of growth of human capital per capita that he uses, so the average level of human capital identically equals the average level of education. The Cobb-Douglas formulation implies a constant elasticity of total factor productivity with respect to average education, which I use in combination with the mean of 12.86 years reported in Table 1 to obtain the effect of a one year increase in average education. Notes to Tables 1-2 Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels are given only for the variables below the broken line:
asignificantly different from zero at the one percent level.
different from zero at the five percent level.
C5jgpjfiCaflt1y different from zero at the ten percent level.
